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For anyone interested in the history of
science in the twentieth century, the volume
provides good summaries of a variety of
subjects. Some chapters would be
disappointing to experts within their own
fields. The book, however, is an invaluable
source ofreference for anyone wishing to dip
into the history of science.
Lara Marks,
Imperial College, University of London
Volker Hess (ed.), Normierung der
Gesundheit. Messende Verfahren derMedizin
als kulturelle Praktik um 1900, Abhandlungen
zur Geschichte der Medizin und der
Naturwissenschaften Heft 82, Husum,
Matthiesen Verlag, 1997, pp. 226, illus.,
DM 69.00 (3-7868-4082-2).
Towards the end ofthe nineteenth century,
"norms" became prominent in sciences from
physiology to psychiatry, anthropology to
genetics, criminology to embryology, and in
such rationalizing movements as Taylorism and
eugenics. Norming health: medical measuring
as a culturalpractice around 1900, based on a
workshop organized by Volker Hess in Berlin
in September 1996, is a collective attempt to
develop a medical historical approach to this
phenomenon. That is a tall order, one measure
of the difficulty of which is the complexity of
relations even between "norm" and the other
"nor"-concepts, "norming", "normal",
"normality" and "normalization". The most
influential models are Georges Canguilhem
and Michel Foucault. Canguilhem critiqued the
nineteenth-century reframing of disease as
quantitative deviation from a medically defined
norm, which he argued did not dojustice to the
norms proper to other ways of life. According
to Foucault's concept of "biopower",
disciplinary technologies came to constitute the
individual, e.g. as a subject of psychometric
testing, while regulatory technologies
constituted the population, and sought, e.g.
through eugenics, to reduce the proportion of
those who deviated from psychometric norms.
Engaging critically with Canguilhem and
Foucault, and embracing recent studies of
setting standards and agreeing measures in
scientific practice, this stimulating volume
explores the construction ofbiomedical norms
and their articulation with wider "cultural
practices" a hundred years ago.
Chapters ofvarious perspectives and
qualities, each followed by a commentary, deal
with the rise ofthe concept of normal value
(Johannes Buttner), norms in psychiatry
(Heinz-Peter Schmiedebach), the semantics
and aesthetics ofthe electrocardiograph
(Cornelius Borck), and photographing
criminals (Mariacarla Gadebusch Bondio). But
it is ofclinical thermometry, the focus of
Hess's own work and a theme in several other
contributions, that we are given the most
sustained and satisfying discussion, and one
which takes us interestingly beyond the Anglo-
American studies such as Stanley Joel Reiser's
Medicine and the reign oftechnology.
In 1868 the Leipzig clinician Carl
Wunderlich pronounced that "Not everyone is
healthy who has a normal temperature; but
everyone is sick whose temperature, upwards
or downwards, exceeds the limits ofthe norm"
(p. 170). Hospitals soon took up thermometry
as a means ofmanaging ever more patients;
temperature charts organized other "practices
ofobjectification" (p. 176) such as taking the
pulse and weighing. Michael Martin describes
sanatoria which caricatured what this could
mean: taking temperatures became the central
preoccupation oflives obsessed with
systematically observing the minutest ofbodily
changes. Wunderlich had had such confidence
in the self-registering power ofthermometers
that he was prepared to allow laypeople to read
them, leaving the physician to interpret the
temperature. Measurement in the sanatoria,
typically every two hours, was increasingly
entrusted to supervised patients. But some
doctors warned of "metromania", and would
hand out only "dumb thermometers", which
patients warmed for a nurse or physician to add
a detachable scale (pp. 155-6).
The dominance of thermometry in total
medical institutions is well known. More
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challenging historically is the general
acceptance of the new instruments and their
values in private practice and homes. In 1913
the Imperial Physical-Technical Institute tested
over 110,000 thermometers a year, many for
domestic use, and-this is crucial-by about
1900 normal body temperature and what
counted as a raised temperature were common
knowledge. Why did laypeople accept these
instruments, apparently with little resistance?
Because, Hess suggests, thermometers did not
simply extend, but could also limit medical
authority.
Patients themselves insisted on diagnostic
instruments and a "thorough examination", and
in increasingly silent medical encounters
temperature-when the patient was allowed to
know it-became a key topic ofconversation.
The numbers were so completely abstract that
they left plenty of room for interpretation. The
middle class, at least, also bought
thermometers to keep at home, possibly
because they could use them to re-appropriate
powers ofdecision-making which they were
otherwise losing to physicians. Gunnar
Stollberg tells us that the feminist Lily Braun
remembered her exhaustion in December 1902
after the Social Democratic Party conference
and Christmas shopping. "How weak I was and
how glowing hot! With my last strength I
crawled into the bedroom and put the fever
thermometer under my arm: 391/2-I called for
Berta [her maid] and sent to the doctor" (p.
133). Braun did not have her temperature taken
under medical supervision, but rather used the
thermometer to decide that she would consult a
physician. Far from invalidating her lay
diagnosis offeeling feverish, she converted it
into a by then binding norm, to which, within
limits, the doctor would also have to submit.
Working-class patients may have done the
same. And, not surprisingly, some clinicians
now began to contest the "overvaluing" of
mere numbers.
Drawing upon the work of Theodore Porter,
Hess argues that within a new "culture of
objectivity" medical experts were as bound by
the norms they produced as were their patients.
I am struck by what an unusual medical
instrument the thermometer was: a key
biomedical tool, generally available and usable
by laypeople who also knew, and to some
extent were medically acknowledged to know,
how to interpret the numbers it offered. Much
norming in medicine around 1900 was far less
"democratic" (p. 188) and much less benign.
But however we assess it, here is a set of
practices crucial to the making of modem
medicine on which this book usefully prompts
us to reflect.
Nick Hopwood, University of Cambridge
Mathew Thomson, The problem ofmental
deficiency: eugenics, democracy, and social
policy in Britain c. 1870-1959, Oxford
Historical Monographs, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998, pp. ix, 351, £48.00
(0-19-820692-5).
Mathew Thomson's new book, its somewhat
misleading subtitle notwithstanding, provides
us with a valuable overview of how the British
(or rather the English, for there is nothing here
about Scotland and Ireland) dealt with the
problem of mental deficiency in the first half
ofthe twentieth century. Developments
between 1870 and 1913 are disposed of rapidly
in a few pages on "the prehistory of mental
deficiency" that form part of the introductory
chapter. Thereafter, the focus is resolutely on
our own century, and most especially on the
notorious 1913 Mental Deficiency Act and its
aftermath.
Thomson seeks to examine his subject from
a number of overlapping perspectives. He
looks at the "high politics" of Parliament and
the Civil Service; the interest group politics of
professions, voluntary groups, and pressure
groups; activities at the level of local
government; and the micropolitical interaction
between those on the sharp end of social
policy-social workers, families, and the
"defectives" themselves. He examines both the
total institutions into which the mentally
defective were segregated, and the growth of
"community care", an approach whose origins
527